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1Introduction 
 What physicists accomplished by unlocking the 
atom in the mid-20th century and engineers did by 
revolutionizing information at the end of that century, 
the life sciences are doing with molecular biology and 
genetics at the dawn of the 21st century.
 Each great advance in technology, it seems, pro-
duces uniquely challenging consequences.
 Today, biotechnology is yielding life-enhancing 
breakthroughs at a thrilling pace. Yet, an elite commu-
nity of scientists attending to these advances is issuing 
stern warnings that these powerful new tools may also 
give rise to ﬁercely destructive forces. This life-giving 
science, they insist, must be secured from abuse. Thus 
far, those who might be expected to respond—author-
ities of government, private business or the academic 
community—have reacted sluggishly, if at all, foisting 
this security policy conundrum onto a very few in the 
science and policy communities who recognize the 
vast rewards and potential dangers inherent in today’s 
life sciences.
 History demonstrates that many advances in 
technology are adapted to warfare, bringing about 
new, more effective forms of weaponization. Advances 
in mechanized combat killed more people in the 20th 
century than died in all of history’s earlier conﬂicts 
combined. With each iteration of technology, the 
tools of warfare become more accessible, not only to 
wealthy and powerful nations but also to the rela-
tively unremarkable individual with sufﬁcient access, 
a modicum of ability and, perhaps most important, 
determination. And there is reason to believe that the 
West’s most determined enemies are in hot pursuit of 
these new opportunities. 
 “Today’s world combines the growing access to 
biological materials and computer power with the an-
ger and hatred it could take to use them as a weapon,” 
said Sam Nunn, a former Carnegie Corporation of 
New York trustee and a global leader in the struggle 
to control weapons of mass destruction, in a speech 
in December 2004. He continued, “This potentially 
lethal combination creates an accelerating risk of cata-
strophic terrorism.”  
 Vartan Gregorian, president of Carnegie Corpora-
tion, agrees that this is an area to which attention must 
be paid.  He says, “Not only recent history but ex-
amples drawn from conﬂicts stretching back into time 
show us how quickly humanity can be overwhelmed 
by forces it wasn’t watching for.  In that connection, 
the development of biological weapons certainly repre-
sents a force we must watch for with great vigilance.”
 A June 1999 memo, retrieved from an al Qaeda 
computer after the fall of Afghanistan in November 
2001, instructs that the means for building bioweap-
ons capacity is to be found at western educational 
institutions, which “allow easy access to specialists.” 
Other reports indicate the terrorist group’s interest in 
obtaining toxins, speciﬁcally, anthrax. Ofﬁcial pro-
nouncements assessing terrorist sophistication in bio-
weapons development run the gamut, from a “fairly 
rudimentary” facility in Kandahar, Afghanistan, to 
reports of an “extensive and well organized” program, 
formerly operated at several Afghani sites, “[t]wo of 
these sites contained commercial equipment and were 
operated by individuals with special training,” whose 
“primary interest” was attempting to create “Agent 
X” —a reference to a so-called unconventional, man-
made, designer bug.
 Critics charge that there is entirely too much 
hype and too little evidence of a clear and present 
threat; some are particularly concerned with the 
tendency to take for granted that a disaster is just 
waiting to happen. They say the learning curve 
for producing a signiﬁcant bioweapon is far more 
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claim the massive infusion of U.S. spending on “in-
cident response,” also known as “civilian biodefense” 
—rising from $410 million in FY01 to more than 
$7.65 billion in FY 05—might be better invested 
elsewhere, for example, in the battle against malaria, 
tuberculosis and AIDS, which collectively claim ﬁve 
million lives annually. They argue for a comprehen-
sive, international approach to biosecurity.
 The necessary alternative, they argue, is a course 
of action that addresses the underlying problems, not 
merely the threats. 
 “I want to change the boundary conditions to 
the problem, the environment in which the problem 
exists, not just say, ‘it is inevitable that it will happen 
so here is what we will do.’ I want to change the en-
vironment so that the problem itself takes a different 
form,” says Matthew Meselson, a microbiologist who 
is the director, at Harvard University, of the Harvard 
Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Armament and Arms Limitation.  Meselson has been 
a leading biosecurity activist for more than 30 years. 
 The goal, as Meselson and others deﬁne it, is to 
manage problems that may enable the use of bio-
weapons. Thus, the thinking is to construct a security 
regime for biology. While the terminology of this 
realm is still in ﬂux, there is some agreement that bi-
osecurity can be viewed as a subset of biosafety, which 
encompasses the broad concept of practicing biologi-
cal science in a safe environment. Put another way, 
biosecurity is about keeping the work safer and implies 
the prevention of the deliberate misuse of pathogens 
and toxins.
 “Both biosafety and biosecurity require that scien-
tists exercise their judgment—Is the project safe? What 
safety level should the experiment be performed at? Are 
we taking all the right safety/security precautions?—and 
it is important to inform that judgment with training,” 
says Gigi Kwik Grönvall, an associate at the Center for 
Biosecurity and assistant professor of medicine at the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC).
 In any case, it stands to reason that securing bio-
technology requires training to certain standards and 
establishing some veriﬁable form of oversight. But 
who decides? Academia? Industry? Government? The 
international community?
 The United States has opted for a go-it-alone, 
domestic approach. In 2001, the U.S. blocked efforts 
to create enforcement provisions for the 1972 Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention (BWC), signed by 151 na-
tions, including the United States, which have agreed 
to ban—to forgo developing, creating or stockpil-
ing—biological weapons. The U.S. position was that 
the proposed enforcement mechanism was too weak.
 The United States has created a domestic regu-
latory environment for biosecurity overseen by the 
National Institutes of Health. Any facility—such as 
a university, and in some cases, private industry—re-
ceiving federal funds, must maintain a self-governing, 
peer-review panel to secure sensitive research and re-
solve ethical dilemmas, such as the appropriateness of 
publishing research ﬁndings that could be abused. 
 “It is entirely appropriate for the United States 
to develop a system to provide oversight of research 
activities domestically, but the effort will ultimately 
afford little protection if it is not adopted interna-
tionally,” according to the non-partisan, National 
Academies’ report entitled, Biotechnology Research in 
an Era of Terrorism.  Better known as the Fink Re-
port, after Gerald R. Fink of MIT who chaired the 
eighteen-member Committee on Research Standards 
and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application 
of Biotechnology that developed it, the report has set 
the benchmark—both within the U.S. and interna-
3tionally—for biosecurity discussions since its release 
in January of 2004. 
 Biosecurity is, by its nature, an international 
problem, for neither the spread of disease nor the 
dissemination of scientiﬁc information respects geo-
political borders. The world is only as secure from the 
abuse of biotechnology as the weakest standards ap-
plied by any single nation.
  “Without international consensus and consis-
tent guidelines for overseeing research in advanced 
biotechnology, limitations of certain types of research 
(in the U.S.) would only impede the progress of bio-
medical research here and undermine our own na-
tional interests” to engage in work overseas, the Fink 
report concludes.
 Increasingly, there is momentum toward treating 
biosecurity as a management problem, necessitating 
shared understanding by two divergent communities: 
biologists and policymakers.
 “Any effort to ameliorate the problems posed by 
biological weapons requires … recognition that there 
is no solution to this problem: it requires ongoing and 
permanent management,” declares the current, inter-
im report of the international Weapons of Mass De-
struction Commission (WMDC). Furthermore, the 
WMDC contends, “managing the biological problem 
requires a set of policies and commitments stretching 
from the individual to the international.”
 In this context, the fundamental approach ad-
opted by Carnegie Corporation of New York focuses 
on the individual whose responsibility it is to inform 
the broader community of science and civilization.  
Therefore, the Corporation devotes much of its work 
in this area to convening and promoting inﬂuential 
partnerships in science and policymaking to enhance 
communications intended to resolve security dilem-
mas arising from biotechnology.
A Life Sciences Perspective
 The Fink Report describes the problem in a nut-
shell: “Biotechnology represents a ‘dual use’ dilemma in 
which the same technologies can be used legitimately 
for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism.”
 Put another way, every advance in biotechnology 
presents a double-edged sword.
 For example, ongoing efforts to develop an aero-
sol measles vaccine promises relief to the developing 
world where infectious diseases are rampant and often 
fatal. (Measles kills at least a half-million children 
annually in the developing world.) Traditional treat-
ments involving injections are logistical nightmares. 
An aerosol would be a vast improvement.
 But once a microbe is aerosolizable, there is poten-
tial for misuse. A deadly organism could be added to 
or used in place of the original microbe and, employ-
ing that same technology, be disseminated not as a 
vaccine but a harmful organism.
 That’s “dual use.”
 Another case in point: the Pentagon’s research 
arm, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency), is working to create what biologists are refer-
ring to as “the human immune system on a chip,” 
which would permit scientists to conduct simulated 
human trials of new drugs without endangering hu-
man guinea pigs. The technology promises to sub-
stantially reduce the time it currently takes to bring 
a new drug to market, which is typically more than 
a decade. The Defense Science Board predicts that a 
breakthrough of this type could help streamline the 
“bug-to-drug” timeframe to 24 hours within the next 
20 years. 
 However, the dual-use threat means that the same 
technology could also assist in the rapid development 
of a particularly nefarious toxin. 
 Perhaps the best known and most frequently 
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research in Australia in the late 1990s, intended to 
create a viral contraceptive to curb a rampant rabbit 
and mouse population. During that research, scien-
tists stumbled upon a way to supercharge mousepox, 
increasing its virulence and making it resistant to 
vaccines, causing fatalities in 60 percent of test cases. 
Fortunately, mousepox is harmless to humans. Unfor-
tunately, if smallpox was substituted for mousepox, it 
could—could—create a strain of the disease without 
any known treatment, and double the normal fatality 
rate for smallpox in humans. 
 Ignore for the moment the fact that the only sam-
ples of smallpox virus in existence are as tightly con-
trolled as highly enriched uranium: after the World 
Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated in 
1980, the only remaining samples were secreted away at 
a U.S. lab in Atlanta and a Soviet lab in Koltsovo, Russia. 
 The signiﬁcant issue facing the Australian re-
searchers was what to do with their ﬁndings: publish 
the results or bury them. They hesitated. But ulti-
mately, they shared their ﬁndings, publishing the 
results just two years after they ﬁrst realized what they 
had produced. In part, their decision to publish was 
predicated on ﬁnding that others were working in the 
same area and it seemed reasonable to assume that it 
was only a matter of time before someone came upon 
the same ﬁndings. And, there was the need to set out 
some warning and create awareness so that counter-
measures could be researched. Publication of the ﬁnd-
ings, however, created a ﬁrestorm of media reaction 
and wrenching soul searching for the life sciences.
 Life scientists typically bridle at the suggestion of 
keeping research results secret, arguing that a greater 
good is almost always served by sharing results, regard-
less of whether those ﬁndings may be of use to an out-
law nation or terrorists.
 “Biotechnology aims at improving medical and 
public health responses and thus saving lives; if you 
don’t share information, the science slows down and 
people die daily,” says Ronald Atlas, co-director of the 
Center for the Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioter-
rorism at the University of Louisville, in Kentucky. 
 Atlas, an authority on bioethics who served on the 
Fink Committee, notes the slippery slope involved in 
deﬁning information as “good,” and therefore worthy 
of publication, versus “dangerous.”
 “You get into a debate about things of value versus 
dangers,” he says. “You could go back to the invention 
of steel, which gave us skyscrapers and bridges but you 
have to balance that with the fact that the same mate-
rial is used for making guns.”
Still, in an age of terrorism, the dual-use issue de-
mands that someone take responsibility for controlling 
knowledge that could cripple civilization.
 The Fink Report’s discussion of dual use and bi-
osecurity comes down heavily in favor of a bottom-up 
approach, advocating self-governance by the life sci-
ences community; perhaps not surprisingly, the panel 
was dominated by academicians whose own interests 
favor self-governance and a “publish-or-perish” ap-
proach to research ﬁndings. 
 The report found that the U.S. Patriot Act of 
2001 and the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 
do a good job of addressing dual use by establish-
ing a set of controls and regulations over federally 
funded biotechnology. Those laws, still being phased 
in, mandate a regulatory scheme that tracks the use 
of dangerous pathogens creating a database of labs 
working in sensitive areas.
 “However,” the Fink Report continues, “they do 
not currently address the potential for misuse of tools, 
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terrorist purposes. In addition, no national or interna-
tional review body currently has the legal authority or 
self-governance responsibility to evaluate a proposed 
research activity prior to its conduct to determine 
whether the risks associated with the proposed re-
search, and its potential for misuse, outweigh its po-
tential beneﬁts.”
 Continuing, the report urges the creation of “a 
comprehensive system, both nationally and interna-
tionally” to address those policy shortcomings. “Only 
a system of international guidelines and review will 
ultimately minimize the potential for the misuse of 
biotechnology,” the report states. It also made seven 
recommendations for a more comprehensive biosecu-
rity regime:
1. Educating the Scientiﬁc Community.  Profes-
sional societies should create programs  to educate 
scientists about the dual-use issue and their re-
sponsibilities to mitigate risks.
2. Review Plans for Experiments. The Department 
of Health and Human Services should establish 
stronger review processes for experiments repre-
senting potential misuse.
3. Review at Publication Stage.  Scientists should 
review submissions for publication to determine 
the potential national security risks. “This part 
of the system,” the report says, “should be based 
on the voluntary self-governance of the scientiﬁc 
community rather than formal regulation by gov-
ernment.”
4. Creation of a National Science Advisory Board 
for Biodefense (NSABB).  Created by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, the 
board would be a vital forum for advice, guidance, 
oversight and review.
5. Protection Against Misuse.  Permit the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity the au-
thority to periodically review current laws regulat-
ing biological materials and personnel.
6. Engage Life Sciences in Security.  Develop 
channels of sustained communications between 
security ofﬁcials and the life sciences community.
7. Harmonize International Oversight.  The scien-
tiﬁc community, with the support of international 
organizations, should create an International 
Forum on Biosecurity to “harmonize national, 
regional and international measures,” with those 
of the United States.
 Responding to the Fink Report, the Department 
of Health and Human Services announced its intent, 
in March 2004, to create a 25-member National Sci-
ence Advisory Board for Biosecurity,  charged with du-
ties that will include advising or providing guidance on: 
• Strategies for local and federal biosecurity over-
sight for all federally funded or supported life sci-
ences research.
• Development of guidelines for biosecurity over-
sight of life sciences research and providing ongo-
ing evaluation and modiﬁcation of these guide-
lines, as needed.
• Strategies to work with journal editors and other 
stakeholders to ensure the development of guide-
lines for the publication, public presentation and 
public communication of potentially sensitive life 
sciences research.
• Development of guidelines for mandatory pro-
grams for education and training in biosecurity 
issues for all life scientists and laboratory workers 
at federally funded institutions.
• Development of a code of conduct for life scien-
tists and laboratory workers that can be adopted 
by federal agencies as well as professional orga-
6nizations and institutions engaged in the perfor-
mance of life sciences research domestically and 
internationally.
 The NSABB, however, remains only a work in 
progress. 
In a related development, in April 2005, after years 
of efforts, organizers launched the International 
Council for Life Sciences (ICLS), a private, member-
ship-based organization, intended to identify and 
manage “biological risks” while facilitating a com-
munity partnership for “governments, international 
intergovernmental organizations and the life sciences 
community—private industry, academia, nonproﬁt 
laboratories and nongovernmental organizations.”
 The ICLS is the creation of two independent 
research groups, the Chemical and Biological Arms 
Control Institute (CBACI) and the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies-US (IISS-US), with the 
support of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
 The ICLS laid claim to serving as the interna-
tional harmonizing inﬂuence described in the Fink 
Report.
 Michael Moodie, president of CBACI, said the 
creation of the ICLS was modeled on the nuclear pow-
er industry’s actions after the meltdown at the Cher-
nobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, when an inter-
national consortium of power plant operators came 
together to adopt strict safety standards, intended to 
reassure a terriﬁed public and, more importantly, stave 
off draconian government regulation of the industry.
 However, Moodie sees the ICLS as engaging a 
much broader set of stakeholders in “managing the po-
tential implications of rapidly spreading knowledge.”
 He says the goal of ICLS is to “create an environ-
ment where all the key players and all the key stake-
holders are contributing partners to the management 
of risk …and that imposes a set of requirements on 
government and a wider array of players than tradi-
tionally has been the case,” which includes private 
enterprise, academia, insurance companies, the media, 
the medical community and public interest organiza-
tions, to name a few.
 A more traditional, top-down, management 
approach to biosecurity is advocated by John Stein-
bruner, director of the Center for International and 
Security Studies at the University of Maryland, who, 
in stark contrast to others, insists that the stakes are 
too high to have anything less than a mandated, le-
gally binding international system of checks and bal-
ances scrutinizing the research and procedures of every 
facility involved in biotechnology. The goal should be 
“complete transparency” he says.
 Presently, approximately 400 mostly academic 
institutions receiving grants from the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) for recombinant DNA research 
must comply with federal oversight guidelines. Some 
corporate facilities voluntarily comply as a good-faith 
effort to observe a “gold standard for safety,” according 
to NIH. Those guidelines mandate that each facility 
appoint and register an Institutional Biosafety Com-
mittee (IBC) —a panel of at least ﬁve members, at 
least two representing the local community and one 
from the lab in question—which must review and ap-
prove any biohazardous research at their facility. The 
IBC is overseen by a 21-member Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee (RAC), which is overseen by 
the Director of NIH; only the most sensitive projects 
require review by all three. 
 Steinbruner says that limiting oversight to those 
facilities funded by NIH is inadequate and, while 
the NIH procedures may provide a sufﬁcient degree 
7of local safety, there is a need to create conforming 
international standards, “so that a proposal made in 
the U.S. would get the same treatment in Germany or 
Nigeria.”
 He envisions a four-tier system of oversight and, 
where appropriate, licensing on a local, national and 
international basis for clearances to conduct sensitive 
research or access sensitive information and dangerous 
materials.
 However, any real movement toward a resolution 
is some time off, he says.
 “The scientiﬁc community is in the embryonic 
stages of dealing with this,” he explains. “And policy-
makers aren’t going to deal with it until there is much 
more consensus than there is now.”
 
An Event-Driven Society
 We live in an event-driven society. Arguably, it’s 
one of the failings of democracy. Dramatic shifts in 
public policy all too frequently require dramatic events 
to build a consensus of public opinion. 
 In some instances, policymakers have succeeded 
in making the case for change by clearly demonstrat-
ing a “clear and present danger.”
 The popular “clear and present danger” argument 
made with respect to biosecurity states: The only ques-
tion regarding a mass-casualty bioweapon incident “is 
not whether, but when” it will occur—and the popular 
time frame ranges from as little as ﬁve years to no 
more than twenty years.
 This expression of the biosecurity problem has 
established the clearest dividing line between factions 
to the debate.
 First, those who embrace the “not whether but 
when” concept as inevitable, either by some failure in 
simple safety procedures or by malfeasance, argue that 
the necessary toxins are accessible (prairie dogs in the 
western U.S. carry plague, for example; other toxins 
can be purchased, some legally, others as stolen goods); 
the necessary laboratory tools are not extraordinarily 
sophisticated, and there may be millions of individuals 
with sufﬁcient knowledge to create large quantities of 
virulent toxins. 
 “Only a thin wall of terrorist ignorance and inex-
perience now protects us,” says Richard Danzig, a Fel-
low at the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies and author of a forthcoming Aspen Institute report, 
Proliferation of Biological Weapons into Terrorist Hands. 
 Thus, the reasoning goes, if it’s only a matter 
of time, our nation’s best course of action is “inci-
dent response,” —preparing for the worst, creating 
surveillance systems to provide early detection and 
warning, manufacturing huge stockpiles of vaccines 
and antibiotics, training ﬁrst responders, expanding 
hospital isolation wards and designing emergency 
quarantine plans.
 Next, there are those who say that a devastat-
ing incident is possible, if we do not prevent it from 
happening. However, many leading activists take 
issue with a prescription focused solely on respond-
ing to a worst-case scenario. While conceding the 
potential for a crisis, they condemn doomsayers’ 
conclusions as pointlessly alarming and dangerously 
defeatist. These activists insist that accepting the in-
evitability of this version of future events threatens 
fundamental tenets of civilization. If we do nothing 
to prevent biowarfare or bioterrorism, they say, those 
worst-case scenarios will most certainly come to pass 
and the consequences, no matter how they are man-
aged—massive quarantines, curtailing food distribu-
tion, closing schools—are unacceptable outcomes for 
modern society. 
 The necessary alternative, they argue, is for a 
course of action that addresses the underlying prob-
8lems, not merely the threats. They focus on preven-
tive measures in addition to building response capac-
ity—surveillance, detection and treatment. Those 
include:
• International security protocols—either in the 
form of self-governing, peer review regimes or as 
mandatory oversight imposed by international 
governance—to manage the knowledge necessary 
to develop and deploy biotechnology.
• Protocols to existing treaties—the 1925 Geneva 
Convention and 1972 Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention—that ban nations from 
creating biological weapons, but lack any effective 
enforcement mechanism.
• Education of life scientists in ethics and govern-
ment policy, heightening awareness of their sen-
sitive work and enabling them to advise  
policymakers.
• Establishing grants and other forms of support 
from the international scientiﬁc community for 
impoverished scientists, such as those in the for-
mer Soviet Union, whose skills and loyalties could 
be bought by the highest bidder.
• Monitoring pathogens, equipment and people 
with the skills necessary for creating bioweapons. 
 A third category involves those who ﬁrmly reject 
the “not whether but when” scenario as dangerously 
alarmist and unlikely in the extreme. They suggest that 
the argument is made without any credible, detailed 
threat analysis.
 Milton Leitenberg, who holds a PhD in biochem-
istry and is a senior research fellow at the Center for 
International and Security Studies at the University of 
Maryland, most recently expressed his skepticism in 
an April 2005 paper entitled, Assessing the Biological 
Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat.  He wrote:
 “For the past decade the risk and im-
manence of the use of biological agents by 
non-state actors/terrorist organizations—‘bio-
terrorism’—has been systematically and delib-
erately exaggerated.  It became more so after 
the combination of the 9/11/2001 events 
and the 10/11/2001 anthrax distribution that 
followed immediately afterwards.  U.S. gov-
ernment ofﬁcials have worked hard to spread 
their view to other countries, and an ediﬁce of 
institutes, programs, conferences, and publi-
cists has grown up to continue the exaggera-
tion and scare-mongering.  In the last year or 
two the drumbeat has picked up.”
 “Others see this as serving necessary 
preparation and even acknowledge the exag-
geration but argue that it is necessary to ob-
tain political action; that is, the expenditure 
of public funds for prevention and response 
programs.  ‘Bioterrorism’ may come someday 
if societies survive all their other impending 
crises.  However, the persistent exaggeration 
is not benign: it is almost certainly the single 
greatest factor in provoking interest in [bio-
weapons] among terrorist groups, to the de-
gree that it currently exists at all, for example, 
in the al Qaeda organization.”
 Additionally, Leitenberg and others argue that 
some U.S. efforts at threat analysis have been mis-
guided and potentially provocative. They are referring 
to programs such as one code named Clear Vision, a 
pre-9/11 exercise in which the CIA built and tested 
a replica of a Soviet bioweapon—a toxin bomb—
which, according to published reports, was real in 
every respect except that it lacked a detonator. Even 
so, critics charge that the exercise was a violation of 
9the BWC, which could also encourage other nations 
to ﬂaunt the treaty’s prohibitions.
 Similarly, these critics oppose “war games” or 
“table-top” exercises, which their organizers say are in-
tended to heighten the understanding for policymak-
ers, but critics condemn as simple fear mongering.
 Perhaps the best known of these exercises, “Dark 
Winter,” held in June 2001, and “Atlantic Storm,” 
staged in January 2005, both sponsored by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies and the Center 
for Biosecurity, were attacked for being premised on 
unrealistic scientiﬁc principles.
 Indeed, these exercises are imprecise expressions 
of present dangers. They do not provide speciﬁc guid-
ance for developing policy. And they are appallingly 
misleading, if taken as literal illustrations of the exact 
public policy actions required. However, as event 
simulations meant to inform policymakers, they have 
value in an event-driven society. 
The Cultural Divide
 There is a cultural divide separating those in gov-
ernment who make security policy from those in the life 
science community. It’s a matter of historical experience. 
Councils of government have a history of experience 
with the physical sciences—building bridges, designing 
power grids, ﬁnancing weapons research, etc.. The post-
World-War-II industries that arose from the military-
industrial complex of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s—the 
airlines and nuclear power, for example—had a sensitiv-
ity to the national security implications of their work 
and readily adapted to government regulation. This was 
an experience unique to the post-World-War-II “brick 
and mortar” industries and government-ﬁnanced facili-
ties such as the Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory. However, until relatively recently, bioscience and 
national security rarely had reason to intersect.
 “Unfortunately, while there have been recent 
discussions involving these communities, the relation-
ship between them has been nearly non-existent,” ac-
cording to Mapping the Global Future, a report of the 
National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, issued in 
December 2004.   
 The report followed several efforts by the national 
security community to ﬁnd common ground with the 
bioscience community in 2002-2003.
 At one of those sessions, a meeting sponsored by 
the Defense Department, ofﬁcials were forced to stop 
midway into their brieﬁng when they realized that 
only a few of the twenty-two bioscientists they invited 
to the session had sufﬁcient security clearance to be 
shown the full brieﬁng.
 “That’s when I started realizing that these two 
communities really don’t relate to each other very 
much,” says Joe Fitzgerald, a consultant to the Federa-
tion of American Scientists on Homeland Security 
and a former director of biosafety at the Department 
of Energy, where he worked for twenty years. “There 
are steps being taken by the government to engage 
with the [life sciences] community, but government 
ofﬁcials are behaving as they would with the physics 
community, assuming certain things and acting in cer-
tain ways, not realizing that it’s a completely different 
group.”
 For example, at another session, this one hosted 
by the National Science Federation on behalf of the 
CIA, several attendees noted the frustration of the 
intelligence community’s representatives at being told 
that there are no “signatures” or “observables” that 
could be used to detect the presence of toxins. Rather 
than making the paradigm shift from nuclear science 
to molecular biology, CIA representatives apparently 
believed they would be able to create a device like a 
Geiger counter to reveal toxins. 
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 Federal regulatory control over nuclear power dur-
ing the Cold War remains the deﬁning experience for 
much of national security. At the end of World War II, 
the federal government had built the wartime academ-
ic and industrial community that gave birth to the 
nuclear era, thus scientists and engineers reacted well 
to government efforts at securing the new technol-
ogy. Even after the bomb-building technology leaked 
to the Soviets and others, an international chokehold 
on highly enriched uranium and plutonium limited 
membership in “the club.” Later still, advances in mis-
sile technology limited those capable of exercising their 
nuclear will internationally. 
 A half-century later, government was slow to 
make the paradigm shift, when the cyber revolution 
took hold under extremely different conditions. The 
cyber security issue came about in the era immediately 
following the collapse of the “Soviet menace,” rising 
amid a tide of post-Cold-War globalization, nurtured 
by a relatively small crowd of innovators who ﬁrmly 
rejected government’s persistent old formula that it 
must “police” cyberspace. As modern society grew 
alarmingly reliant upon new cyber technologies—and 
therefore, deeply vulnerable—the privately created, 
privately owned and privately operated network of 
networks refused federal efforts to impose intrusive 
security over the Internet. A fairly ugly policy brawl 
dragged on through much of the 1990s, eventually 
reaching an uneasy détente under terms dictated large-
ly by the private sector, an arrangement under which 
industry and governments share the management of 
risk, informing one another of threats, without the 
intrusive controls initially sought by law enforcement 
and national security.
 Today, when another paradigm shift is needed for 
government to engage with the bioscience community 
to manage biosecurity, the Department of Homeland 
Security is still dominated by entrenched nuclear-era 
policymakers and scientists.
 A collaboration involving the national security and 
bioscience research communities could be key to mini-
mizing the challenges posed by proliferation of research 
ﬁndings that have bioterror and BW [bioweapon] ap-
plications,” concluded the 2020 Project report.
According to many experts, a promising means of 
establishing that collaboration is through education, 
both formal and informal. That may sound simplis-
tic at ﬁrst, but a “bottom-up” approach to problem 
solving is sometimes preferable to the “top-down” 
method.
 Meselson makes the case for the bottom-up ap-
proach being effective, just as what he describes as 
“simple, good hygiene” serves as an effective solution 
to stopping the spread of disease.
 Education of scientists and policymakers is key to 
“fostering the kind of culture of responsibility” needed 
to establish biosecurity, says Moodie of CBACI. That 
includes “inculcating this material into the curricula in 
graduate schools” for students of science and political 
science.
 Frank von Hippel, a microbiologist from Princ-
eton University, has suggested the need for “a career 
path in biopolicy, speciﬁcally, defense policy.”
 George Atkinson, Science and Technology Advi-
sor to the Secretary of State, agrees that scientists need 
to have a direct role as policymakers.
 “Two or three decades from now, you will ﬁnd 
some very distinguished scientists at the table as lead-
ers of the policy community,” says Atkinson, who 
holds a PhD in chemistry. “The goal is to have scien-
tists sitting at the table as negotiators, not sitting in the 
back, whispering in the ear of the negotiator.” 
 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is 
developing curricula for graduate school programs, in-
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troducing students to biosecurity issues, familiarizing 
them with the ethical standards, laws and internation-
al regulations that impact on research. The intent is to 
provide an understanding of when it is appropriate to 
publish and when it is not. One case study questions 
the work of a researcher at SUNY, Stony Brook, who 
synthesized poliovirus and was widely castigated in the 
media for publishing the results. Another case study 
examines the development of aerosolized toxins.
 FAS plans to produce a white paper explaining 
how universities can establish their own centers for 
biosecurity research and policy. Carnegie Corporation 
is underwriting the FAS’ efforts, which will lead to the 
establishment of such a center by 2009.
 Another Corporation grant is supporting a some-
what less formal education environment. In August 
2005, the ﬁrst “class” of Jefferson Science Fellows will 
have completed their one-year in service at the State 
Department. The program, underwritten by Carnegie 
Corporation and the John D. and Catherine T.  
MacArthur Foundation, is a unique opportunity for 
policymakers working on global science issues to in-
teract with career scientists. The ﬁve Fellows return to 
their positions at universities but will remain as con-
sultants on a variety of short-term State Department 
projects for the next ﬁve years.
 “The Jefferson program represents an important 
step toward allowing the scientists to be trusted by 
the policymakers,” says Atkinson, noting the added 
value science can bring to diplomacy “We Ameri-
cans do science and technology very well, and we … 
would be well served if the world saw science and 
technology as a hallmark of what American society 
provides.”
 Carnegie Corporation’s role in biosecurity, which 
began in 2000 by supporting arms control efforts, has 
evolved. Among other facets of the bioweapons issue, 
the Corporation now seeks, through its grantmaking, 
to integrate bioscience and biotechnology expertise 
within national security by funding education pro-
grams that inform postgraduate biologists about the 
rigors of policymaking as well as introducing inﬂuen-
tial biologists into the policymaking realm. 
 Additionally, the Corporation continues to exer-
cise its proven convening power.  In the fall of 2004 
it hosted a day-long session on biosecurity, bringing 
together its grantees working on the issue, lead-
ing research scientists, medical educators, biologists 
and policymakers focused on the need for building 
partnerships of science and policy in biosecurity. In 
reﬂecting on the meeting, Patricia Nicholas, the Cor-
poration’s International Peace and Security program 
associate responsible for the biological weapons work, 
said, “The predominant theme from those around 
the table, grantees and nongrantees alike, was that if 
the Corporation wants to strengthen the link between 
the bioscience and security communities, then the key 
element is to educate: educate the bioscience research 
community to recognize that some of its work—de-
spite the potential for beneﬁcial ends—may have secu-
rity implications.  And educate the security commu-
nity that bioscience has a role to play in policymaking.  
This represents a wonderful opportunity for the 
Corporation, because it means that the foundation is 
occupying a niche that is at the heart of our mission.” 
In Conclusion
 Matthew Meselson has been chewing on this 
problem as long as anyone—more than 40 years. He 
worked with President Richard Nixon to bring the 
United States into the BWC in 1975. Today, he is 
promoting the Harvard Sussex Convention, which 
he describes quaintly as: “Something my good friend 
Julian Robinson [Harvard Sussex director in England] 
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and I have contrived, a draft convention that would 
criminalize the use of biological or criminal weapons 
internationally.”
 The Harvard Sussex Convention would establish 
an international set of laws deﬁning abuse of chemical 
or biological weapons as crimes against humanity and 
conferring “on national courts jurisdiction over indi-
viduals present in their national territory, regardless of 
their nationality or ofﬁcial position, who order, direct, 
or knowingly render substantial assistance to the use of 
biological or chemical weapons anywhere,” according 
to the Harvard Sussex Program web site, http://www.
sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/.
 What makes the Harvard Sussex proposal of 
particular interest is the logic with which it elegantly 
erases national borders in the interests of civilization. It 
also heralds the arrival of the biologist as policymaker, 
or at the very least, someone who can inﬂuence the 
policy debate, perhaps giving new meaning to the idea 
of self-governance.
 “Some people say the ultimate catastrophe 
would be an event that killed a great many people 
and that certainly would be terrible,” Meselson says. 
“But the ultimate tragedy would be if the use of biol-
ogy for hostile purposes became assimilated into the 
practice of human beings” because “once this kind of 
warfare is begun there is a continuous, slow erosion 
of civilization.”
 Meselson may be the leading opponent to the 
mindset of “when not whether,” arguing that the long, 
historic view of securing civilization demands a sum-
mary rejection of the concept.
 “The most important thing our species has 
achieved is civilization,” says Meselson. “An awful 
lot of blood has been spilled to do that…. That’s the 
thing that matters most. Because biologic warfare 
would mean an end to all that… Biological weapons 
have the ability to do great damage. For example, re-
ducing crop yields, even slightly, or doing other things 
we cannot even imagine, can change the determina-
tion of a population. I know this sounds like it’s very 
far off, and it is, but we’re playing with ﬁre.”
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